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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 981437-CA 
vs. : 
Priority No. 2 
MICHAEL W. SPAULDING, : 
Defendant/ Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, 
methamphetamine, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2) (1998). This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did defendant's possession of marijuana and a marijuana pipe arise out of the 
same "single criminal episode" as his constructive possession of methamphetamine so 
as to preclude the State from prosecuting defendant for felony possession of 
methamphetamine following his guilty pleas to misdemeanor possession of marijuana 
and drug paraphernalia? 
This issue of statutory construction is reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Keppler, No. 981182CA, slip op. at 2 (Utah App. March 25, 1999) (Appendix A). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-401 through 403 are reproduced in 
Appendix B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 26, 1997, defendant was arrested and issued misdemeanor citations 
for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia and for parking in a grassy area. 
On September 8, 1997, defendant pleaded guilty to these three offenses (R. 72). On 
the same day, a felony information was filed charging defendant with possession of 
methamphetamine (R. 1). At a preliminary hearing on December 12, 1997, defendant 
moved to dismiss the information based upon Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403, the "single 
criminal episode" statute (R. 73:3). This motion was denied, and defendant was found 
guilty by a jury of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine (R. 47). On 
June 30, 1998, defendant was sentenced to a term of 1-15 years on the 
methamphetamine charge, with execution of sentence stayed pending defendant's 
completion of 36 months probation and serving ten days in jail (R. 55-57). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 26, 1997, defendant and Monique Case were traveling from Idaho to 
Arizona by motorcycle and stopped at Willard Bay State Park in Box Elder County (R. 
2 
73:4, 7-8). Officers Ulysses Black and James Crapse approached defendant and Ms. 
Case, who were sitting at a picnic table, due to the fact that defendant's motorcycle was 
parked illegally on the grass (R. 73:17). The officers saw a bowl of marijuana at the 
table, and defendant was holding a marijuana pipe (R. 73:19). At another picnic table 
several feet away, the officers found a small tin box which contained methamphetamine 
in a pocket of a pair of pants belonging to defendant (R. 73:20-21, 28-29). 
Defendant was cited for parking on a grassy area and for possession of 
marijuana and drug paraphernalia. On September 8, 1997 defendant appeared before 
the district court for arraignment on these misdemeanor charges. Immediately upon 
defendant's guilty pleas to these charges, the prosecutor requested that sentencing be 
delayed due to the fact that he had just that morning received a report regarding the 
methamphetamine found in defendant's pants, and that a felony charge arising out of 
that report might be filed (R. 72:4-5). The court then immediately offered to allow 
defendant to withdraw his guilty pleas to the misdemeanor charges. Defendant declined 
to do so at that time, and subsequently never made a request to withdraw his 
misdemeanor pleas following the State's decision to pursue the felony charge (R. 72:5, 
7-8). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Since defendant's brief was filed, this Court issued its opinion in State v. 
Keppler, No. 981182CA (Utah App. March 25, 1999). In Keppler, the Court rejected 
3 
the same argument made by this defendant, based on facts that are virtually identical to 
the facts of this case. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 defines a criminal episode as 
including all conduct which is closely related in time and incident to a "single criminal 
objective." Under Keppler, the criminal objective of a possessory offense depends 
upon the specific nature of the property possessed. Thus, although defendant's 
possession of marijuana and a marijuana pipe was contemporaneous with his possession 
of methamphetamine, these criminal acts do not share a criminal objective. These 
offenses are therefore not part of a "single criminal episode" which must be charged in 
a single action under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-402 & 403. Accordingly, defendant's 
prior guilty pleas to misdemeanor charges of possession of marijuana and drug 
paraphernalia do not preclude this later prosecution of defendant for possession of 
methamphetamine. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA AND 
HIS POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE DO NOT 
ARISE OUT OF A SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE 
Defendant claims in this appeal that the State is barred from prosecuting him for 
felony possession of methamphetamine because the State also cited him for 
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia and marijuana, and allowed him to plead 
to those misdemeanor charges prior to filing the felony methamphetamine possession 
4 
charge. This argument is based upon Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(1) (1974), which 
provides that 
If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of 
a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a 
different offense is barred if (a) the subsequent prosecution is for an 
offense that was or should have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) 
in the former prosecution; and (b) The former prosecution . . . resulted in 
conviction. 
Under § 76-1-402(2) (1974), if multiple charges arise out of a single criminal episode, 
a defendant cannot be subject to separate trials unless the court orders otherwise. Thus, 
in order for the State to be barred from prosecuting defendant for the felony 
methamphetamine charge, the trial court must find that the prior charges of possession 
of marijuana and drug paraphernalia were a part of the same "criminal episode." 
The term "single criminal episode" is defined for purposes of this rule as "all 
conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401. 
Accordingly, resolution of this case depends upon a finding as to whether defendant's 
possession of methamphetamine is, under the specific facts of this case, "incident" to 
the accomplishment of the same criminal objective as defendant's possession of 
marijuana and a marijuana pipe. 
The issue presented by this case is substantially resolved by the court's ruling in 
State v. Keppler, No. 981182CA (March 25, 1999). In that case, the court considered 
5 
whether Keppler's prior guilty plea to possession of drug paraphernalia precluded a 
later prosecution for possession of methamphetamine when the drug paraphernalia and 
the methamphetamine were found in Keppler's possession "at the same time and in the 
same location." 
The court held that the criminal objective in a possessory offense is determined 
by "the specific nature of the property possessed." Id., slip op. at 2. Accordingly, the 
defendant's criminal objectives were, for the respective offenses, to possess 
methamphetamine and to possess drug paraphernalia. Since these objectives were 
different, they were not part of the same criminal episode under section 76-1-401. See 
also State v. Strader, 902 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah App. 1995). 
The only distinguishing fact between this case and Keppler is that in this case, 
defendant plead guilty to possession of both marijuana and drug paraphernalia prior to 
the filing of the methamphetamine charge. Keppler noted that the drug paraphernalia 
charge was based upon a separate statutory provision, and used that fact to emphasize 
the point that drug paraphernalia possession and methamphetamine possession do not 
share a common criminal objective. Keppler, slip op. at 2. However, the fact that 
defendant's possession of methamphetamine and marijuana were charged under the 
same general code section does not distinguish this case from Keppler for several 
reasons. 
6 
First, although the court in Keppler noted that the possessory offenses at issue 
were punishable under different code sections, it did not base its decision on that fact; 
rather, the court held more broadly that it is the "specific nature" of the property which 
determines whether possession shares the same criminal objective. Id., slip op. at 2. 
In every one of the cases from other jurisdictions cited approvingly by the court in 
Keppler, the separate charges at issue were for possession of two different types of 
controlled substances, as is true in this case. Indeed, in most of these cited cases, the 
separate possessory offenses were charged under the same code section. See People v. 
ManarreZy 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 247 (Cal. App. 1998) (defendant was properly charged 
separately under the same code section for simultaneous possession of heroin and 
cocaine); Cunningham v. State, 567 A.2d 126 (Md. App. 1989) (same); State v. 
Delfino, 490 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1986) (defendant was properly charged separately 
under the same code section for simultaneous possession of cocaine and marijuana). 
As was true in these cases cited in Keppler, the distinction between different 
types of controlled substances has been fully recognized by the Utah Legislature. 
Although possession of controlled substances is generally prohibited by Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8, the code treats drug offenses differently depending upon the specific 
type of controlled substance at issue. Thus, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(b)(iii), marijuana possession is a class A misdemeanor, and pursuant to Utah Code 
7 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii), methamphetamine possession is a third degree felony.1 "The 
narcotics are separately classified and regulated by the Legislature; they have different 
effects and pose different hazards to society." Manarrez, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d at 250. 
In addition, there is no reasonably characterized 'common objective' for these 
offenses asserted by defendant. Defendant claims that the common purpose of all the 
charged offenses was "illicitly to use controlled substances." Brief of Appellant, p.5. 
Such a characterization of the purpose of the charged offenses could hardly be stated 
more broadly, and is the equivalent of saying that his purpose was "to break the law." 
At this level of generality, almost any combination of crimes would fall under the 
single criminal episode rule, since it is only the illegality of the acts which gives them 
any commonality at all. Instead, as Keppler requires, the criminal objective of 
defendant's possessory acts must be characterized in terms of the specific substance 
possessed: defendant's objective in one offense was to possess marijuana and in the 
other offense was to possess methamphetamine. Thus, in each case, defendant's 
purpose was not simply to possess an illegal substance; it was to possess a particular 
drug which has particular properties. See Strader, 902 P.2d at 642 (the objectives of 
the criminal acts are to be construed narrowly for purposes of determining whether they 
1
 Defendant's methamphetamine possession charge was raised from a third 
degree felony to a second degree felony because the offense took place in a public park. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(c) (1998). 
8 
constitute a single criminal episode under section 76-1-401). See State v. Cornish, 571 
P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977) (offenses cannot be treated as a single criminal episode 
under section 76-1-401 because "although the testimony given may overlap, the 
offenses are different and the proof requirements are different."). The distinction 
drawn between these crimes by the legislature distinguishes thus this case from 
situations which section 76-1-403 was obviously intended to address, where a defendant 
could otherwise be forced to defend essentially the same charge in multiple 
prosecutions. See State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 1983). 
Ultimately, the unreasonableness of defendant's argument is made clear by the 
fact that his argument would seem to dictate joinder of offenses even in cases where 
such would likely be improper. Under defendant's view, joinder of offenses would be 
required under section 76-1-402 whenever similar offenses are committed by a 
defendant, no matter how unrelated they are factually. In many cases, it is the very 
similarity of unrelated offenses which forms the basis for a motion to sever, as evidence 
used to show guilt on one offense could be improperly used to imply guilt of another 
unrelated but similar crime.2 See State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980) 
(joinder of similar offenses is improper when there is no showing that there is a 
2
 As in Stradery "a cynic might suggest that if the three charges would have been 
brought together initially, [defendant] would have moved to sever, arguing that the 
three offenses were completely distinct wrongs and that he would be prejudiced if they 
were all tried together." 902 P.2d at 641 n. 3. 
9 
common scheme, and where the evidence admissible to prove each offense would not 
be admissible with regard to the others); State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114 (Utah App. 1992) 
(issue as to whether joinder is prejudicial to a defendant depends upon whether 
evidence of the other crime would have been admissible in a separate trial.) 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ _ day of April, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
SCOTT KEITH WILSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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COURT OF APPEALS 
Sta te of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Kalob Ted Keppler, 
Defendant and Appellant 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 981182-CA 
F I L E D (March 25, 1999) 
1999 UT App 089 
First District, Brigham City Department 
The Honorable Ben H. Hadfield 
Attorneys: Kevin McGaha, Brigham City, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and James Beadles, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Wilkins, Greenwood, and Billings. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
ill Kalob Ted Keppler (defendant) appeals from a conditional 
guilty plea for possession of a controlled substance, a third 
degree felony. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
*{2 On April 5, 1997, in a search incident to an arrest, 
defendant was found in possession of marijuana, methamphetamine, 
and a pipe with marijuana residue. Defendant was cited for 
possession of drug paraphernalia and on April 14, 1997, he 
pleaded guilty to that offense, a class B misdemeanor, and was 
sentenced to probation. That same day, the State filed an 
information charging defendant with possession of 
methamphetamine, possession of a controlled substance, and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. These charges all arose from 
the evidence discovered during the April 5th search. 
1|3 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that his guilty 
plea to possession of paraphernalia barred the district court 
prosecutions because the offenses were all part of the same 
criminal episode under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(1)(a) (1995). 
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and defendant 
subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of 
methamphetamine, reserving his right to appeal. The State had 
already dismissed the other charges. 
ANALYSIS 
1(4 This appeal presents a single question: Whether, under the 
"single criminal episode" statute, see id. § 76-1-403(1), a 
prosecution for possession of methamphetamine is barred when 
defendant had already pleaded guilty to possession of drug 
paraphernalia found at the same time and in the same location as 
the methamphetamine. We review the trial court's interpretation 
of a statute for correctness and accord no deference to its 
conclusions of law. State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 
1995) . 
115 The statutory scheme provides "[i]n this part unless the 
context requires a different definition, 'single criminal 
episode1 means all conduct which is closely related in time and 
is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single 
criminal objective." Id. § 76-1-401 (emphasis added). In this 
case, although defendant's concurrent possession of the marijuana 
pipe and the methamphetamine satisfied the temporal requirement 
of the statute, the possession does not satisfy the "same 
criminal objective" requirement. See id. 
1)6 The specific nature of the property possessed determines the 
offense in a possession offense. In this case, we note that the 
property implicated in the two charges is not of the same 
quality. The Legislature expressly prohibits the possession of 
drug paraphernalia and the possession of methamphetamine as 
separate statutory offenses. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 
(2) (Supp. 1998) (possession of a controlled substance) with Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (Supp. 1998) (possession of drug 
paraphernalia). Other courts which have evaluated this statutory 
structure have concluded it creates discrete crimes even when the 
contraband items are found simultaneously. See, e.g., People v. 
Monarrez, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 247 (Cal. App. 1998), reVt denied 1998 
Cal. Lexis 8599 (Cal. 1998). See also Cunningham v. State. 567 
A.2d 126, 129 (Md. Ct. App. 1989); People V, HiltS, 638 N.Y.S.2d 
491, 492 (1996); State v. Delfino. 490 N.E. 2d 884, 887-88 (Oh. 
1986) . 
%1 Further support for the separate nature of defendant's 
crimes comes from State v. Porter. 705 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah 
1985) . In that case, the defendant had, within twenty minutes, 
burglarized an apartment and a laundry room, both located in the 
981182-CA 2 
same building. The court concluded that defendant's crimes were 
separately punishable because "defendant's actions did not 
constitute a single crime," since the elements of burglary and 
aggravated burglary are different. Id. at 1178. See also State 
v. Strader. 902 P.2d 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (holding that 
giving false identification to a police officer not incident to 
same criminal objective as possession of methamphetamine). 
Similarly, defendant's crimes in this case are separately 
punishable. 
CONCLUSION 
K8 We conclude that the crimes do not satisfy the .second 
statutory requirement for a single criminal episode as the crimes 
have separate criminal objectives. We therefore affirm. 
rmdith M. Billings, Judge 
19 WE CONCUR: 
Michael J. Wilkins, 
Presiding Judge 
<2h>*uy&' S ' 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
981182-CA 3 
ADDENDUM B 
259 CRIMINAL CODE 76-1-403 
(i) at any time during which the defendant holds a 
public office or during the period of his public employ-
ment; or 
(ii) within two years after termination of defen-
dants public office or public employment, 
(b) Except as provided in Section 76-1-301.5, Subsec-
tion (3) shall not extend the period of limitation otherwise 
applicable by more than three years. 1995 
76-1-303.5. Sexual offense against a child. 
If the period prescribed in Subsection 76-1-302(1) has ex-
pired, a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for rape 
of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, sexual 
abuse of a child, or aggravated sexual abuse of a child within 
four years after the report of the offense to a law enforcement 
agency. 1996 
76-1-304. Defendant out of state — Plea held inval id — 
N e w prosecut ions . 
(1) The period of limitation does not run against any 
defendant during any period of time in which the defendant is 
out of the state following the commission of an offense. 
(2) If the defendant has entered into a plea agreement with 
the prosecution and later successfully moves to invalidate his 
conviction, the period of limitation is suspended from the time 
of the entry of the plea pursuant to the plea agreement until 
the time at which the conviction is determined to 6e invalid, 
and that determination becomes final. 
(3) For purposes of this section, "final" means: 
(a) all appeals have been exhausted; 
(b) no judicial review is pending; and 
(c) no application for judicial review is pending. 
(4) When the period of limitation is suspended pursuant to 
Subsection (2), the suspension includes any charges to which 
the defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, 
charges which were dismissed as a result of a plea agreement, 
as well as any known charges which were not barred at the 
time of entry of the plea. 
(5) Notwithstanding any other limitation, a prosecution 
may be commenced for charges described in Subsection (4) 
within one year after a plea entered pursuant to a plea 
agreement has been determined to be invalid, and that deter-
mination becomes final. 1998 
76-1-305. Lesser included offense for which period of 
limitations has run. 
Whenever a defendant is charged with an offense for which 
the period of limitations has not run and the defendant should 
be found guilty of a lesser offense for which the period of 
limitations has run, the finding of the lesser and included 
offense against which the statute of limitations has run shall 
not be a bar to punishment for the lesser offense. 1973 
76*1-306. Judge to determine. 
When an issue concerning the statute of limitations is 
raised, the judge shall determine by a preponderance of the 
evidence whether the prosecution is barred by the limitations 
in this part. 1996 
PART 4 
MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS AND 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined — Jo inder 
of offenses and defendants . 
In this part unless the context requires a different defini-
tion, "single criminal episode" means all conduct which is 
closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the 
effect of Section 77-8a-l in controlling the joinder of offenses 
and defendants in criminal proceedings. 1995 
76-1-402. Separate offenses aris ing out of s ingle crimi-
nal episode — Included offenses. 
( D A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal 
action for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under a 
single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provi-
sion; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such 
provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses un-
der a single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise 
orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to 
separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single 
court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney 
at the time the defendant is arraigned on the first 
information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in 
the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the 
offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so 
included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all 
the facts required to establish the commission of the 
offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or 
form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an 
offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser 
included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with 
respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis 
for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged 
and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, 
or an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine 
that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for 
the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to 
support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of 
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that 
included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be 
set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for 
the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such 
relief is sought by the defendant. 1974 
76-1-403. Former prosecut ion barring subsequent 
prosecut ion for offense out of same episode. 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a subsequent 
prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out of 
the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that 
was or should have been tried under Subsection 76-1-
402(2) in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment 
for the defendant that has not been reversed, set 
aside, or vacated and that necessarily required a 
determination inconsistent with a fact that must be 
established to secure conviction in the subsequent 
prosecution. 
76-1-404 CRIMINAL CODE 260 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a 
finding of not guilty by the trier of facts or in a determination 
that there was insufficient evidence to warrant conviction. A 
finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of 
the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser 
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or va-
cated. 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a 
judgment of guilt that has not been reversed, set aside, or 
vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been reversed, set 
aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a judgment; 
or a plea of guilty accepted by the court. 
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the 
termination takes place before the verdict, is for reasons not 
amounting to an acquittal, and takes place after a jury has 
been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury 
trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, 
termination of prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the 
termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the 
termination is necessary because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the 
trial in conformity with the law; or 
lii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not 
attributable to the state that would make any judg-
ment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of 
law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom 
not attributable to the state makes it impossible to 
proceed with the trial without injustice to the defen-
dant or the state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent 
a fair trial. 1974 
76-1-404. Concurrent jurisdict ion — Prosecut ion in 
other jurisdict ion barring prosecut ion in 
state. 
If a defendant's conduct establishes the commission of one 
or more offenses within the concurrent jurisdiction of this 
state and of another jurisdiction, federal or state, the prosecu-
tion in the other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecu-
tion in this state if (1) the former prosecution resulted in an 
acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution, as those 
terms are defined in Section 76-1-403, and (2) the subsequent 
prosecution is for the same offense or offenses. 1973 
76-1-405. Subsequent prosecution not barred — Cir-
cumstances . 
A subsequent prosecution for an offense shall not be barred 
under the SoYiowing circumstances: 
(1) The former prosecution was procured by the defen-
dant without the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney 
bringing the subsequent prosecution and with intent to 
avoid the sentence that might otherwise be imposed; or 
(2) The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of 
guilt held invalid in a subsequent proceeding on writ of 
habeas corpus, coram nobis, or similar collateral attack. 
1978 
PART 5 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
76-1-501. Presumpt ion of innocence — "Element of the 
offense" defined. 
( D A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be 
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him 
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, 
the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" 
mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of 
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the defini-
tion of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements 
of the offense but shall be established by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 1973 
76-1-502. Negat ing defense by al legation or proof — 
When not required. 
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a defense: 
(1) By allegation in an information, indictment, or 
other charge; or 
(2) By proof, unless: 
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as a result of 
evidence presented at trial, either by the prosecution 
or the defense; or 
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense, and the 
defendant has presented evidence of such affirmative 
defense. 1973 
TO-\-5fo&. PTfcs\rarp\itm t>1 iBtfc. 
An evidentiary presumption established by this code or 
other penal statute has the following consequences: 
(1) When evidence of facts which support the presump-
tion exist, the issue of the existence of the presumed fact 
must be submitted to the jury unless the court is satisfied 
that the evidence as a whole clearly negates the presumed 
fact; 
(2) In submitting the issue of the existence of a pre-
sumed fact to the jury, the court shall charge that while 
the presumed fact must on all evidence be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the law regards the facts giving rise to 
the presumption as evidence of the presumed fact. 1973 
76-1-504. Affirmative defense presented by de fendant 
Evidence of an affirmative defense as defined by this code or 
other statutes shall be presented by the defendant. 1973 
PART 6 
DEFINITIONS 
76-1-601. Def in i t ions . 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this 
title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and in-
cludes speech. 
V^ > " k c W means a person whose mmiuiai TesponsftaV 
ity is in issue in a criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury* means physical pain, illness, or any 
impairment of physical condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious 
bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of 
the item leads the victim to reasonably believe 
the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily 
injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally 
or in any other manner that he is in control of 
such an item. 
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of 
this state. 
